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I. INTRODUCTION 
Foreign blocking statutes are considered a thorn in the side of U.S. 
discovery in transnational cases. These laws forbid the disclosure of 
evidence sought under U.S. rules of federal procedure.1 A further 
complication for discovery arises from the combination of two more 
recent phenomena in American law. The first is the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as expressed in Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. I thank the organizers of the symposium 
on discovery at the University of Akron Law School for inviting me to participate and to contribute 
my thoughts in written form, particularly Calleigh Olson and Danielle Schantz. Sincere thanks also 
to Manon Troin and Inès Soumhi for their able research assistance. Unless otherwise noted, 
translations are mine. 
1. See, e.g., 3 Louis B. Kimmelman & Steven L. Smith, Litigating International Disputes in
Federal Courts § 21:97 (4th ed. 2017). 
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Ltd.2 (and as further elaborated by the U.S. Supreme Court in several 
subsequent cases),3 in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s growing 
attention to international comity in the same case law.4 The second 
complication is the growth of transnational digital discovery.5 
Judicial discovery tools function in terms of territoriality concepts 
because they depend on the territorially-defined jurisdictional powers of 
the courts.6 Over many decades, the transnationalization of law has been 
a story of deterritorialization, but nowhere is this truer than where digital 
data is at issue: the cloud cannot be localized, but precedents oblige parties 
to argue in terms of the national territory in which data is localized, as 
though all data were tangible.7 Most recently, the Supreme Court 
considered the case of United States v. Microsoft Corp.,8 which might 
have enabled a ruling better adapted to digital data than we currently have. 
Congress enacted legislation intended to regulate the issue after the Court 
had granted certiorari,9 and the Court then held the controversy moot.10 
Legal transnationalization has resulted from increased mobility and 
encounter,11 which at the judicial level in turn creates increased awareness 
both here and abroad of foreign legal conceptions and perceptions. The 
2. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
3. E.g., J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
4. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 108. It has been pointed out that the modern presumption against
extraterritoriality is itself partially based on international comity. William S. Dodge, International 
Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2079-80 (2015). 
5. See infra Section IV.
6. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality and the Resolution of Jurisdictional
Conflict, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631 (2009) (calling into question the validity of this basis in a globalized 
world). 
7. One scholar argues that to think about “global law” one must stop thinking about legal
norms in any traditional sensenamely, that the transnationalization of the global necessitates a more 
profound shift in our benchmarks. See Benoît Frydman, Comment penser le droit global?, Working 
Paper du Centre Perelman de Philosophie du Droit, 
http://www.philodroit.be/IMG/pdf/comment_penser_le_droit_global_2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XSC6-RJRX] (last visited May 23, 2018).  
8. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
9. See infra Section IV for more on this legislation, known as the CLOUD Act, 115 Pub. L.
No. 141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018). It was enacted on March 23, 2018 and signed into law as part of the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act 2018, 115 Pub. L. 141. This legislation provides, inter alia, an 
amendment to the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (“SCA”), the statute at issue in 
Microsoft Corp. 
10. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1186. 
11. See Benoît Frydman, Les défis du droit global, in LES DÉFIS DU DROIT GLOBAL 20 (Benoît 
Frydman & Caroline Bricteux eds., 2018); TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004); JEAN-SYLVESTRE BERGÉ & GENEVIÈVE 
HELLERINGER, OPERATING LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: COMPARING, COMBINING AND 
PRIORITISING (2017); ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, GLOBALIZATION: THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES (1998). 
2
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United States, however, unlike its European counterparts, retains a long 
and entrenched tradition of requiring judges to refrain from engaging in 
comparative legal analysis.12 One of the most enlightened opinions in 
international discovery analysis, by Judge Friendly, resulted from 
ignoring that tradition.13 The resistance to analyzing foreign law continues 
despite Judge Friendly’s example, under the strong force of stare decisis, 
a fortiori since the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the principle in Intel 
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.14 
Foreign blocking statutes are also commonly raised as an objection 
where a foreign litigant or other interested person petitions a U.S. court 
for U.S.-style discovery in its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1782.15 The 
discussion below will analyze blocking statutes and § 1782 petitions 
as they interface with U.S. discovery. It then will address how 
concepts developed for tangible documents located in identifiable 
places are being applied to digitized data on the cloud. Cloud issues 
epitomize law’s globalization or transnationalization, as they are the 
ultimate illustration of the deterritorialization with which law, a field 
defined by territory, is faced today. 
II. U.S. DISCOVERY AND THE FOREIGN BLOCKING STATUTE
A. Background 
The first U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with a foreign blocking 
statute was Société Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et 
Commerciales, S. A. v. Rogers.16 The case involved two Swiss laws, 
including Switzerland’s blocking statute concerning banking information. 
The Court deferred to the blocking statute, persuaded by evidence of the 
Swiss company’s good-faith efforts to comply with U.S. discovery, its 
lack of collusion with the Swiss government to thwart discovery, as well 
as the severity of the criminal law penalties it risked incurring if it violated 
the banking secrecy statute by complying with U.S. discovery.17 
Rogers set the standard for the criteria that U.S. courts have 
continued to follow in analyzing foreign blocking statutes’ appropriate 
12. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004) (drawing on
an already long-established tradition in federal appellate courts). 
13. In re Letters Rogatory Issued by Director of Inspection of Government of India, 385 F.2d
1017, 1020 (1967). 
14. 542 U.S. at 243. 
15. See infra Section III.
16. 357 U.S. 197 (1958). 
17. Id. at 208, 211. 
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effect on discovery requests, although the Supreme Court later 
supplemented other factors to consider.18 More specifically, U.S. courts 
deny discovery requests where the defense of a foreign blocking statute 
can persuade the court that the law will be enforced by the foreign state 
against the objecting party, and that the objecting party risks serious 
penalties, especially criminal, by violating it. Thus, in 2014, in Motorola 
Credit Corp. v. Uzan,19 the Southern District of New York allowed 
discovery to proceed in the face of objections raised on the basis of 
French, Jordanian, and Emirati blocking statutes, which forbade the 
disclosure of the relevant evidence under criminal penalty of law, but, 
tellingly, not against the Swiss bank party. The court reasoned that, “[i]n 
contrast with the French situation, Switzerland’s bank secrecy regime 
constitutes, not just a seriously enforced national interest, but almost an 
element of that nation’s national identity.”20 
Rogers was decided in 1958. At that time and for many years after, 
obtaining documents and other evidence beyond national boundaries was 
a notoriously slow and difficult process.21 Consequently, an international 
treaty on evidence gathering in international civil and commercial matters 
was concluded in 1970 to facilitate and render the process more efficient 
and speedy.22 This was the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad 
in Civil or Commercial Matters.23 Such a treaty would no doubt have been 
infeasible had it permitted discovery in its U.S. form, since the latter is 
unique in the world in its breadth and level of intrusiveness.24 An opt-out 
feature therefore was provided so that signatory states could decline to 
provide U.S.-style pretrial evidence. According to Article 23 of the Hague 
Convention, contracting states may make a declaration that they “will not 
execute letters of request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial 
discovery of documents as known in common law countries.”25 While 
some of the 62 signatory states have only partially adopted this opt-out 
feature, generally by referring to pretrial “fishing expeditions” as 
18. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
19. 73 F. Supp. 3d 397, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
20. Id. Accord, S.E.C. v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323, 341 (N.D. Tex. 2011). 
21. See Gary B. Born, The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited: Reflections on Its Role in
U.S. Civil Procedure, 57-SUM LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 78 (1994); Vivian Grosswald Curran, 
United States Discovery and Foreign Blocking Statutes, 76 LA. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (2016). 
22. See Curran, supra note 21; and Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 530-31 (explaining U.S.
objectives in promoting the Hague Convention). 
23. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Oct. 7, 
1972, 23 U.S.T. 2555 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
24. This remains the case even after the reforms of 2015. See Curran, supra note 21, at 1147. 
25. Hague Convention, supra note 23, at art. 23. 
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unacceptable, there are not many states that have not invoked Article 23 
at all.26 
Harkness and his co-authors have noted that “many contracting states 
operate on the assumption that the Hague Convention is the only means 
for securing [foreign] discovery” among contracting states.27 What these 
authors call an “assumption” is a position many contracting states 
espouse, pursuant to which, as far as they are concerned, any discovery 
order emanating from a U.S. court that does not come via the Hague 
Convention is illegitimate, since the United States is a contracting state.28 
To be perfectly clear, it is not an “assumption” arising out of ignorance of 
U.S. law, but a legal position.29 They knowingly reject the U.S. view 
dating from the Supreme Court holding in Aérospatiale.30 In that case, the 
U.S. Supreme Court concluded as follows: the Hague Convention was 
neither exclusive nor even the preferred first method for obtaining 
evidence abroad, and litigants could initiate discovery using the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.31 
As the partial concurrence and dissent in Aérospatiale predicted, the 
majority’s holding presaged the end of the Hague Convention as the 
ordinary means for obtaining evidence abroad in civil and commercial 
litigation.32 For the litigant, the Federal Rules provide the advantage of 
far broader discovery than the typical limitation that the Hague 
Convention Article 23 permits.33 For the U.S. judge, as well as litigant, 
the Hague Convention has remained an unfamiliar text, while the Federal 
Rules have the advantage of being daily fare.34 As Born and Rutledge 
26. See TIMOTHY P. HARKNESS, RAHIM MOLOO, PATRICK OH & CHARLINE YIM, DISCOVERY 
IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES 16-17 (2015). For an updated list of those and 
all contracting states, see 20: Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in 
Civil or Commercial Matters, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-
table/?cid=82 [https://perma.cc/RVK8-8G3L] (last visited Mar. 6, 2018) (table reflecting 
applicability of arts. 15, 16, 17, 18 and 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention). 
27. HARKNESS et al., supra note 26, at 11.
28. See Daniel Barlow, Première application pénale de la loi de blocage de 1968, Note sous
Cour de cassation (crim.) 12 décembre 2007, 2008 REVUE DES SOCIETES 882, para. 13 (2008). 
29. See, e.g., Knight Capital Partners Corp. v. Henkel AG & Co., 290 F. Supp. 3d 681 (E.D.
Mich. 2017). 
30. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 548 (1987). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. (“Experience to date indicates that there is a large risk that the case-by-case comity
analysis now to be permitted by the Court will be performed inadequately and that the somewhat 
unfamiliar procedures of the Convention will be invoked infrequently.”). 
33. See, e.g., Connex R.R. LLC v. AXA Corporate Solutions Assurance, No. CV 16-02368-
ODW (RAOx), 2017 WL 3433542, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017). 
34. See Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 548. 
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have suggested, the net effect of Aérospatiale has been to place more 
decision-making power in this area in the hands of district court judges 
than in most areas of law involving international issues with foreign 
comity concerns because discovery objections tend to arise on motions in 
limine and generally are not subject to review at the interlocutory stage.35 
While these authors express a concern that the dearth of appellate review 
will lead to intercircuit lack of uniformity, another byproduct of that very 
paucity has been a greater tendency of courts dealing with blocking 
statutes to cite to other circuits as they look for applicable persuasive 
appellate authority due to the very absence of much overall authority, thus 
paradoxically increasing the likelihood of intercircuit uniformity,36 
despite some observable distinctions among circuits.37 
B. Recent Case Law Analyzing Blocking Statutes 
As the Motorola court articulated in 2014, the courts have applied 
the standards the Supreme Court set forth in Aérospatiale since 1987. 
Since 2013, the courts also look to Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, 
Ltd.,38 a U.S. Supreme Court case that arose in the context of interpreting 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.39 In that case, litigants 
were compelled to produce information in discovery despite applicable 
blocking laws from Spain, Brazil, Chile, Panama, Bolivia, Paraguay, 
Argentina, Uruguay, and the Cayman Islands.40 Some of these blocking 
laws, invoked as defenses to discovery, were based on bank secrecy 
statutes and some even on foreign state constitutions (those of Panama 
and Paraguay).41 
35. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS 1042 (2011).  
36. See, e.g., Republic Techs. (NA), LLC v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP, No. 16 C 3401, 
2017 WL 4287205, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2017) (Northern District for Illinois citing to Southern 
District of New York); Connex R.R., 2017 WL 3433542, at *14 (Central District of California citing 
to two Eastern District of New York cases and two other New York district courts); Strauss v. Credit 
Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (Eastern District of New York citing to the 
Seventh Circuit).  
37. My research, for example, indicates the Second Circuit as being more likely to rule in favor 
of proceeding with Federal Rules discovery in the face of blocking statute defenses than the Seventh 
or Eleventh Circuits. 
38. 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014). 
39. 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1330, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-171). 
40. For a discussion of the lower court defenses asserted by Argentina in NML Capital, see 
Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 73 F. Supp. 3d 397, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In NML Capital, the 
Supreme Court alluded to the defendant’s dilatory tactics with respect to discovery, noting that it had 
been ten years since the plaintiff had been trying to discover Argentina’s assets. NML Capital, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2253. 
41. NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2253. 
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 9
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss3/9
2017] DISCOVERY IN A TRANSNATIONAL AND DIGITAL AGE 863 
A student note published in 2018 tried to systematize the proportion 
of compelled discovery orders where each defense that had been raised of 
foreign blocking statutes had involved the potential for both criminal and 
civil penalties. The study concluded that the courts compelled Federal 
Rules discovery in 37 out of 42 cases.42 
The Supreme Court derived the Aérospatiale standard it continues to 
apply from Rogers and what became § 442(1)(c) of the Restatement 
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.43 Since then, 
the Restatement (Fourth) has been finalized. In the matters relevant to this 
discussion, the Restatement (Fourth) does not materially alter the previous 
one.44 Aérospatiale’s factors, consistent with the Restatements (Third) 
and (Fourth) of Foreign Relations, consider how important the requested 
documents are to the litigation; how specific the discovery requests are; 
whether the evidence located abroad originated in the United States; if the 
party requesting the discovery has other means of obtaining the evidence; 
and if the court’s deference to the foreign blocking statute would 
undermine U.S. “important interests” or, conversely, if, by compelling 
discovery, the court would undermine the foreign state’s “important 
interests.”45 
The comity analysis courts have applied under Aérospatiale’s above-
listed last criterion of interest balancing has been closely linked to 
studying whether the relevant foreign state actually enforces its blocking 
statute, a factor that had been underscored by the Supreme Court three 
decades earlier in Rogers when it deferred to Switzerland’s bank secrecy 
law. By the time of Aérospatiale, when the Supreme Court was deciding 
this issue in terms of the French blocking statute, it could rely on the lower 
court’s holding that France’s law did not need to be taken seriously.46 
After Aérospatiale, the Supreme Court’s finding that the French blocking 
statute’s criminal penalty need not overcome a party’s right to conduct 
discovery under the Federal Rules became the highest precedent for that 
proposition.47 
42. M.J. Hoda, The Aérospatiale Dilemma: Why U.S. Courts Ignore Blocking Statutes and
What Foreign States Can Do About It, 106 CAL. L. REV. 231, 234 (2018). 
43. The Supreme Court referred in Aérospatiale to the Restatement (Third) § 437, the
predecessor to later § 442. 
44. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
222 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016). 
45. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 544, n.28 (1987). 
46. Id. at 527. 
47. See, e.g., Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) and 
sources cited therein. 
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For many years France’s statute was not applied, and to date only 
four applications have been made.48 French legislative history uncovered 
and quoted by a U.S. court even revealed the motive of thwarting U.S. 
discovery without the intent to apply the statute, if passed, against French 
nationals.49 While this situation lasted for many years, the French 
Supreme Court eventually affirmed the application of its blocking 
statute.50 Still, some U.S. courts under the sway of stare decisis continued 
to cite to U.S. precedents that predated France’s application of its law, for 
the outdated proposition that France did not apply the blocking statute. 
One such case, decided in 2017, was Republic Technologies (NA), LLC v. 
BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP,51 in which the court cited to a 1984 case for 
the proposition that “[t]he Blocking Statute obviously is a manifestation 
of French displeasure with American pretrial procedures. . . . There is no 
evidence that France’s interest in its blocking statute has changed or that 
France has become more vigorous in enforcing its blocking statute in 
recent years.”52 The Republic Technologies court also found, in keeping 
with precedent, that “the French blocking statute was not aimed at 
protecting [the] state, but at merely protecting [French] corporations from 
foreign discovery requests.”53 In contrast, it described as “vital” the U.S. 
interest in “providing a forum for the final resolution of disputes and for 
enforcing these judgments,”54 concluding with no further analysis that 
U.S. interests “outweigh the sovereign interests (if any) that France has.”55 
Republic Technologies concerned information in France of the 
subsidiary of a U.S. company against whom a motion to compel discovery 
had been filed.56 The court granted the motion, holding that the 
determinative factor in whether a parent company can be compelled to 
produce documents of a subsidiary is if the parent has the “legal right to 
obtain them.”57 Some recent cases acknowledge France’s somewhat 
48. TGI Nanterre, 22 décembre 1993, JurisData n° 1993-050136; CA Versailles, 16 mai
2001, JCP E 2007, 2330, Cass. 2e civ., 20 novembre 2003, n° 01-15.633; T. com. Paris, Vac., 20 
juillet 2005; Cass. crim., 12 décembre 2007, n° 07-83.228 (Christopher X). 
49. Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. SS Seatrain Bennington, Nos. 80 Civ. 1911 (PNL), 82 Civ. 0375
(PNL), 1984 WL 423 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1984). 
50. Christopher X, supra note 48. 
51. Republic Techs. (NA), LLC v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP, No. 16 C 3401, 2017 WL
4287205 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2017). 
52. Id. at *4 (quoting in part a 1984 case that predated the French Supreme Court’s enforcement 
of its blocking statute, Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 508 (N.D. Ill. 1984)). 
53. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Id. 
55. Id. at *5 (emphasis added). 
56. Id. at *1. 
57. Id. at *2. 
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belated applications of its blocking statute under the pressure of copies of 
translated French decisions and other documents filed with U.S. district 
courts.58 Yet, on the whole, while the non-enforcement of the statute 
figured heavily as a reason against deferring to it, the fact of its occasional 
enforcement does not mean that U.S. courts are deferring to it now. 
Thus, in another 2017 case, Connex Railroad LLC v. AXA Corporate 
Solutions Assurance,59 the French Ministry of Justice wrote a letter to 
signal the potential criminal liability France’s blocking statute would 
subject the French defendant company.60 The court accepted this as 
signifying that the statute applied to the defendant.61 It also found that the 
documents that formed the object of the discovery probably originated in 
France, not the United States (one of the Aérospatiale factors militating 
against Federal Rules discovery).62 Here, the court even found that the 
defendant’s agreement to comply with the Hague Convention’s expedited 
procedure seemed to make the latter a viable alternative means for 
plaintiff to obtain the documents,63 but it reasoned that the Hague 
Convention’s “effectiveness” had been questioned.64 The court noted that 
the Hague Convention provides a narrower scope of discovery than the 
Federal Rules and that, therefore, it could not be said necessarily to 
constitute a truly viable alternative means to Federal Rules discovery.65 
Finally, despite taking judicial note of the French Supreme Court 
(Cour de cassation) case applying the blocking statute, the court stated 
that this example, even when combined with the French Ministry of 
Justice’s declaration of criminal vulnerability of the French defendant, 
was insufficient to persuade it that the defendant would run the risk of 
criminal prosecution in France if it were compelled to comply with 
Federal Rules discovery.66 Citing to U.S. case law that Aérospatiale made 
famous concerning the French blocking statute, the California district 
58. See, e.g., Connex R.R. LLC v. AXA Corporate Solutions Assurance, CV 16–02368–ODW 
(RAOx), 2017 WL 3433542 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017) (translation of French Supreme Court decision 
and letter from French Ministry of Justice); S.E.C. v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323, 
333, n.13 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (citing a law review article about the French enforcement of a blocking 
statute); In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, No. 05-
MD-1720(JG)(JO), 2010 WL 3420517, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010) (Eastern District of New York 
citing Northern District of California).  
59. Connex R.R., 2017 WL 3433542. 
60. Id. at *11. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at ∗13. 
63. Id. at ∗14 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at ∗14-15. 
66. Id. at ∗17. 
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court reasoned that “many [U.S.] courts have discounted that risk [of 
criminal prosecution] in the context of the French Blocking Statute, noting 
that the Blocking Statute does not subject defendants to a realistic risk of 
prosecution.”67 It also (correctly) distinguished Christopher X, the French 
criminal law prosecution under France’s blocking statute that France’s 
Supreme Court upheld, because that case had nothing to do with a U.S. 
discovery request, but, rather, dealt with a French lawyer who had tried to 
get evidence from a French witness for use in a trial in the United States. 
It had not involved a dispute around the Hague Evidence Convention and 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This is indeed an important distinction that diminishes the utility of 
the case to the discovery context.68 Where it might continue to be seen as 
having some traction is that one can deduce from the Christopher X case 
the depth to which a core value of the French legal system had been 
undermined by a lawyer’s approaching a witness directly, where in France 
such actions are for judges alone to do. Similarly, U.S. pretrial discovery’s 
perceived prying and intrusiveness offend deep values in France of 
privacy,69 just as U.S. evidence-taking conducted in France offends 
l’ordre public (fundamental values) inasmuch as only judges may do so 
in France.70 
The latest French development with respect to its blocking statute 
has been to pass a new law, la loi Sapin II,71 to apply the blocking statute 
more vigorously. In addition to la loi Sapin II’s strengthening the French 
blocking statute, the Executive Branch of the French government has 
created a new position to oversee the enforcement of the French blocking 
statute.72 Meanwhile, the latest development in the United States is a case 
in which the federal district court did not compel U.S. discovery under the 
67. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. The court did not require that plaintiff proceed under the Hague Convention. Id. at *19. 
69. See infra discussion of Henry Zoch II v. Daimler, A.G., No. 4:17-CV-578, 2017 WL
5177959, nn.98-101 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2017) and surrounding text; Curran, supra note 21, at 1147. 
70. See Curran, supra note 21. 
71. Art. 2, Loi n° 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la 
corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique, JORF n°0287 du 10 décembre 2016, available 
on Legifrance, French government site for legislation, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000033558528&categorieLien=id [https://perma.cc/9XRX-
B4JD]. 
72. Décret n° 2016-66 du 29 janvier 2016 instituant un commissaire à l’information stratégique 
et à la sécurité économiques et portant création d’un service à compétence nationale dénommé « 
service de l’information stratégique et de la sécurité économiques », ORF n°0025 du 30 janvier 2016, 
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Federal Rules where the French defendant raised the French blocking 
statute as a defense.73 
Although in no way referring to or at all recognizing the latest 
legislative and executive measures in French law to strengthen the 
blocking statute through heightened obligatory enforcement and 
oversight, and indeed, once again stating the time-honored principle that 
it was not inquiring into French law but simply accepting the statement 
concerning French law’s penalties from the moving party because the 
latter had an experienced and credible French attorney who had spoken to 
the issue,74 the Arizona district court in Salt River Project Agricultural 
Improvement and Power District v. Trench France SAS  ruled that it 
would apply the Hague Evidence Convention.75 In this novel case, the 
court concluded that the discovery requests were not necessarily 
“narrowly tailored”76 to the case, further noting that the relevant 
documents of the French party were located in France. (The court did not 
speak to their place of origination, the criterion the Supreme Court had 
held to be the relevant factor in Aérospatiale.)77 
The court also accepted the moving party’s assertion over its 
opponent that the information sought was available through the Hague 
Convention, noting that the assertions to that effect were made by a French 
attorney experienced in Hague Convention practice.78 Most interestingly, 
while most U.S. courts have found that France’s sovereign interest in 
enforcing its blocking statute is outweighed by the U.S. national interest 
in protecting plaintiffs’ rights and preserving broad-based discovery,79 the 
Arizona court in Salt River Project held otherwise: “Unlike the U.S. 
interests, which are unlikely to be impaired if Hague procedures are used, 
this French interest [in enforcing its blocking statute] may be impaired if 
this Court simply orders discovery.”80 This decision may be an exception, 
or it may be a harbinger of increased deference to foreign blocking statutes 
under the sway, among other influences, of heightened attention to 
73. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist. v. Trench France SAS, No. CV–
17–01468–PHX–DGC, 2018 WL 1382529 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2018). 
74. Id. at *2 (citing Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1474, n.7 
(9th Cir. 1992)). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at *3. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522 (1987) and its vast progeny. 
80. Salt River Project, 2018 WL 1382529, at *4. 
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international comity and the presumption against extraterritoriality that 
have been gaining ground in recent years.81 
As this case demonstrates, despite their reluctance to do so, it has 
been impossible for U.S. judges to avoid engaging in comparative law.82 
Thus, in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Stanford International 
Bank, Ltd.,83 the district court in Texas stated that, “[a]lthough the Court 
is reluctant to interpret Swiss law, the Court finds the [Swiss] expert’s 
reading accurate.”84 The courts must interpret and understand the foreign 
blocking statute if they are to draw the necessary conclusions regarding 
the following issues: whether the statute in fact would preclude the 
information requested through discovery, whether the laws of the foreign 
nation would lead to criminal sanctions, and whether the foreign legal 
system does or does not enforce its law. 
In a 2017 case involving a German blocking statute concerning data 
protection, Knight Capital Partners Corp. v. Henkel AG & Co.,85 the court 
once again engaged in some discussion of the foreign law at issue.86 The 
court looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 and to Ninth Circuit 
case law to indicate that, “in determining foreign law,”87 it could “look to 
cases, regulations, treatises, scholarly articles, legislative history, treaties 
and other legal materials. . . .”88 Moreover, in this case in which the court 
compelled discovery under the Federal Rules, the court rejected the idea 
that it should be guided by the German legal expert in determining the 
meaning of German law: “[T]he Court certainly has both the authority and 
the duty to construe the meaning of the statute in the first instance, 
informed by the ordinary principles of statutory construction and by 
reference to the plain language of the statute itself.”89 Since legal experts 
in the United States, unlike in Germany and France, are party experts, not 
court experts, U.S. judges may be leery of their conclusions.90 In this 
instance, however, where the court alluded to interpreting German law 
according to “ordinary principles of statutory construction,” those rules of 
81. See Kimmelman & Smith, supra note 1; Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 
(2010). 
82. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 333. 
85. 290 F. Supp. 3d 681 (E.D. Mich. 2017).
86. Id. at *3. 
87. Id. at *4. 
88. Id. 
89. Id.
90. On this issue and judicial frustration, see Easterbrook, J., in Bodum USA, Inc. v. La
Cafetière, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2010).  
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construction no doubt refer to ordinary U.S. rules of statutory 
construction. 
This was not a promising approach to understanding German law. 
Rules of statutory construction are different in Germany and France from 
those in the United States. Civil-law legal systems originally were built 
from the premise that textual, codified law contains all legal solutions and 
that judges may not create law.91 As a consequence of being text-based, 
civil-law legal systems are far more developed in the area of statutory 
construction, especially in Germany where canons of construction have 
reached a level of exquisite organization.92 The “meaning” of a law, as the 
court put it in Knight, may vary substantially as a function of rules of 
construction. Others, from the Supreme Court to scholars, have noted the 
very real risks of mistakes where judges do engage in foreign or 
comparative law analysis.93 A risk of the policy against doing so is to 
increase the probability of error where, as is ever more the case in the 
globalized world, our courts must, and therefore do, engage in this 
process, but are less well prepared to do so than they otherwise might be 
if they engaged in comparative law fully and openly through adequate 
research and education and perhaps other innovations, such as court-
appointed experts.94 
The court in Knight rejected the German “expert’s opinion that 
discovery is permissible only when conducted on the basis of the Hague 
Convention [because it] is flatly contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in the Aérospatiale case.”95 The German expert whose opinion the court 
summarily dismissed as incorrect was reflecting Germany’s official legal 
perspective, which is the same as France’s.96 Aérospatiale reflected the 
depth of U.S. law’s commitment to wide discovery as a fundamental right 
of litigants in American courts, albeit one that a U.S. court might have a 
duty to tailor more narrowly than ordinarily under the Federal Rules 
91. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal 
Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 93 (2001). 
92. See, e.g., James R. Maxeiner, Scalia & Garner’s Reading Law: A Civil Law for the Age of 
Statutes?, 6 J. CIV. L. STUD. 1, 16-22 (2013).  
93. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 542 U.S. 241, 243 (2004); Hans Smit,
American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 
of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1, 9 (1998). 
94. The United States stands virtually alone among western legal systems to reject comparative 
law today. 
95. Knight Capital Partners Corp. v. Henkel AG & Co., 290 F. Supp. 3d 681, 689 (E.D. Mich. 
2017).  
96. See id. (noting that many states take this position where information is sought by another
Hague contracting state, rejecting Aérospatiale’s position as contrary to international law). 
13
Curran: Discovery in a Transnational and Digital Age
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
870 AKRON LAW REVIEW [51:857 
where comity concerns became a consideration.97 In proceeding through 
the Aérospatiale factors, the Knight court noted that the German blocking 
statute’s main objective was “to protect its citizens from [U.S.] discovery 
obligations.”98 It appeared to base this conclusion solely on a similar 
finding by the Eastern District of New York, which, in U.S. domestic 
parlance, also is “foreign law” to a Michigan court. 
The Knight case can be contrasted with the Eastern District of 
Texas’s 2017 Henry Zoch II v. Daimer, A.G. decision.99 Though that court 
similarly granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery under the 
Federal Rules over a German defendant’s objections, it did find that 
“Germany has a weighty national interest in protecting personal 
data. . . .”100 The court was aware that Germany had not just enacted a 
statute but that the government had filed an amicus brief in a different case 
to declare the importance of privacy interests in Germany, and that the 
value of privacy is so fundamental to German law and society that it also 
is enshrined in Germany’s constitution.101 None of this ultimately 
persuaded the court to deny plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery, where 
it found, under the Aérospatiale criteria, that (1) the requested information 
was important to the litigation; (2) the plaintiff had made specific, well-
tailored requests for information, even though (3) the information did not 
originate in the United States, but where the court also found that (4) the 
plaintiff had no alternate means to acquire it, presumably precisely due to 
the privacy rights blocking law; and where (5) Germany’s weighty interest 
in protecting its citizens’ privacy interests was counterbalanced by the 
United States’ “substantial interest in vindicating the rights of American 
plaintiffs and adjudicating matters before its courts.”102 
A different result has been obtained where objections to discovery 
arose on the part of the European Commission (EC) purely on the basis of 
comity, however, with no assertion of a formal blocking statute. Blocking 
statute cases at first blush would seem to have the stronger claim to 
success in defeating Federal Rules discovery, given that objections based 
on them are founded on the potential for criminal penalties by the party 
97. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 545-46 (1987).  
98. Knight, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 691.
99. Henry Zoch II v. Daimler, A.G., No. 4:17-CV-578, 2017 WL 5177959 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 
2017).  
100.  Id. at *6. 
 101.  Id. Privacy interests are perceived differently in both Germany and France from the United 
States. National memory of the Nazi years has been a strong influence on the protection of personal 
data in both European states.  
102.  Zoch, 2017 WL 5177959, at *5-6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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raising a foreign blocking statute as a defense. Consequently, in those 
cases, courts inquire into the foreign state’s habits of enforcement or, as a 
corollary mode of inquiry, into the defendant’s motives: sincere attempts 
to comply with U.S. discovery or, on the contrary, an attempt to make use 
of the foreign national’s blocking statute precisely to circumvent the 
discovery request.103 
The pure comity cases have involved the EC where its own prior anti-
competition litigation was concerned.104 Courts have declined to compel 
Federal Rules discovery where the information sought was in a 
subsequent U.S. antitrust case.105 This occurred in Payment Interchange 
Fee, where the defendant had submitted redacted documents the plaintiff 
had requested from EC litigation, and had asked the EC if it was permitted 
to reveal more in order to comply with the discovery requests.106 The EC 
had refused, submitting its objections to the court.107 The court noted how 
intimately linked to other litigation the requested information was and that 
the documents had originated in Europe, not the United States.108 It found 
persuasive that the privacy rights the EC proceedings accorded to parties 
were of grave importance to the EC, notably in ensuring that future 
investigations were not held under the specter of the abrogation of parties’ 
privacy by potential U.S. Federal Rules discovery if a U.S. case were to 
follow at a later date.109 
The court held that the U.S. plaintiff’s right to discovery was 
outweighed by the EC’s “interest in confidentiality [because the latter] 
plays a significant role in assisting the effective enforcement of European 
antitrust law.”110 This case, as many others, heeded the Ninth Circuit 
assessment in Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants,111 that the 
Aérospatiale comity factor of balancing national interests is the 
weightiest. Both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have also indicated that 
courts will deny motions to compel discovery if “the outcome of the [U.S.] 
 103.  See, e.g., Société Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S. A. v. 
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). 
 104.  See In re Payment Interchange Fee, No. 05-MD-1720) (JG)(JO), 2010 WL 3420517 (E.D. 
N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010); In re Rubber Chemicals, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
105.  See In re Payment, 2010 WL 3420517.  
106.  See id. at *3. 
107.  See id.  
108.  Id. at *9. 
109.  See id.; In re Rubber, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1080, n.1, 1083 (noting that participants in the 
EC’s Leniency Program received leniency if they confessed to anti-competitive conduct and need to 
preserve privacy of participants for continued functioning of program).  
110.  In re Payment, 2010 WL 3420517, at *9. 
111.  959 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992).  
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litigation does not stand or fall on the present discovery order.”112 The 
comity cases, which yield rulings against Federal Rules discovery even in 
the absence of blocking statutes, may signal a shift towards taking 
blocking statutes more seriously because of international comity 
concerns. Such a shift will have to overcome the long tradition of placing 
great weight on the U.S. courts’ vindicating the rights of parties to Federal 
Rules discovery.113 
III. SECTION 1782 PETITIONS
A. Background 
U.S. courts’ preference for discovery under the Federal Rules reflects 
their deep respect for the plaintiff’s right to access discovery. Discovery 
has gained the stature of a constitutional or quasi-constitutional right.114 
A strong interest of the United States is the vindication of U.S. plaintiffs’ 
rights and providing a forum to adjudicate their claims. Under § 1782, 
U.S. courts have also in general shown a great inclination to honor the 
petitions for U.S.-style discovery, only here the petitioners are not U.S. 
parties, but foreign litigants, courts, and other interested persons, and the 
information they request is for use in foreign litigation occurring in 
another nation. 
The section reads in relevant part as follows: 
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found 
may order him to give testimony or statement or to produce a document 
or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international 
tribunal. The order may be made pursuant to . . . the application of any 
interested person [and] . . . [t]o the extent that the order does not 
prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the 
document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.115 
Section 1782 is designed to allow U.S. courts to provide assistance in 
foreign litigation.116 In these cases, a U.S. court in its discretion is 
 112.  Id. (citing In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 999 
(10th Cir. 1977)); accord In re Rubber, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1078; Fenerjian v. Nong Shim Co., Ltd., 
No. 13-cv-04115-WHO (DMR), 2016 WL 245263 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2016).  
113.  See Curran, supra note 21, at 1141, and sources cited therein. 
114.  Id. 
115.  28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1964).  
116.  See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 249 (2004) (citing S. REP. 
NO. 1580, at 7-8 (1964)); Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We 
have . . . noted that Congress purposefully engineered section 1782 as a one-way street. It grants wide 
16
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agreeing to assist a foreigner in obtaining information that will be 
produced within the U.S. court’s jurisdiction, and to do this despite the 
fact that the information sought would generally not be discoverable in 
the foreign forum in which the litigation is taking place.117 
The only § 1782 case to have been adjudicated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court to date is Intel. The principal issue in that case was whether the 
executive branch of the European Union, the EC, could constitute a 
“tribunal” within the meaning of § 1782, despite the EC itself having 
argued to the contrary.118 Intel set the standard for § 1782 petitions in 
several ways since it was decided in 2004. In particular, since Intel, even 
where the petitioner is an individual foreign litigant, a defense that the 
information sought is not discoverable in the foreign forum litigation is 
not a bar to discovery.119 According to the Restatement (Fourth), § 1782 
“is not limited to information the production of which the foreign or 
international tribunal could order, or that would be admissible in the 
foreign or international proceeding.”120 Moreover, whereas at one time the 
location of the documents sought was a relevant criterion, “[i]n the 
contemporary world, where documents exist mostly in virtual form, and 
may be accessed from many locations, territorial location may become 
less relevant.”121 
The Restatement (Fourth) departs from its last two predecessors in 
shifting the legal theory for decisions to enforce § 1782 discovery 
obligations from international law (as was the case in Restatement 
(Second) § 40 and Restatement (Third) §§ 441, 442) to principles of 
international comity: “Current state practice does not support the claim 
that the defense of foreign-state compulsion rests on international law. 
Rather, the defense reflects the practice of states in the interest of 
comity.”122 
A seminal case in § 1782 law that dates from 1995123 established 
several principles that have continued to characterize judicial rulings: (1) 
it may be reversible error to deny a § 1782 petition on the basis that the 
discovery requested would be unavailable to the foreign legal system in 
assistance to others, but demands nothing in return.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
117.  See Intel, 542 U.S. at 241.  
118.  The Court held it was a tribunal for purposes of § 1782. Id. at 242-43. 
119.  See id. at 243-44. 
120.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 306 
(Reporter’s Note 3, 2016) (emphasis added). 
 121.  Id., Reporter’s Note 7 (citing In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled 
and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)).  
122.  Id., Reporter’s Note 9. 
123.  Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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whose forum the litigation takes place;124 (2) U.S. courts may not impose 
a “quasi-exhaustion” requirement on § 1782 petitioners, in the sense that 
a petition need not be preceded by the petitioner’s attempt to obtain the 
information in the forum jurisdiction;125 and (3) U.S. judges should not 
attempt to understand the foreign law or legal system of the foreign 
forum.126 At that time an intercircuit split divided jurisdictions’ 
perspectives on the relevance of foreign discoverability to § 1782 
petitions.127 
In 2004, however, the Supreme Court formally rejected the criterion 
of discoverability in the foreign forum as contrary to the statute: “While 
[concerns of] comity and parity [among litigants] may be important 
touchstones for a district court’s exercise of discretion in particular cases, 
they do not permit our insertion of a generally applicable foreign-
discoverability rule into the text of § 1782(a).”128 The Supreme Court also 
underscored a third criterion in Intel: “Section 1782 . . . does not direct 
United States courts to engage in comparative analysis to determine 
whether analogous proceedings exist . . . Comparisons of that order can 
be fraught with danger.”129 The Court added in a footnote that the 
“comparison of systems is slippery business.”130 
Justice Ginsburg was quite right that the dangers of error are very 
real when comparing legal systems, yet comparison is necessary because 
it is inevitable. Thus, Justice Breyer dissented in Intel in part because of 
the majority’s denial of foreign law’s relevance.131 One might wonder 
how international comity and parity among parties litigating in a foreign 
system can have any meaning, as the majority in Intel nevertheless 
suggested they might, if that system, its proceedings, and laws are not to 
play any role in the exercise of discretion by federal district courts in § 
1782 cases. 
Following in the footsteps of Esmerian, the Second Circuit in In re 
Application for an Order Permitting Metallgesellschaft AG to take 
Discovery, dealing this time with German rather than French pending 
124.  Id. at 1098. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. at 1099; Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 243 (2004).  
127.  See, e.g., Eleventh and First Circuits, with cases noted in the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Jacobs in Esmerian, 51 F.3d at 1103 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (noting also that the majority in that case 
had taken the leap from permitting the district courts of the Second Circuit to allow discovery under 
§ 1782 despite non-discoverability in the foreign jurisdiction, to requiring them to do so). 
128.  Intel, 542 U.S. at 243. 
129.  Id.  
130.  Id. at n.15. 
131.  See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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litigation, reversed a district court denial of a § 1782 petition.132 The lower 
court relied on precedents for the proposition that foreign discoverability 
could be “a useful tool in the exercise of [the district court’s] discretion”133 
in § 1782 cases. According to the Second Circuit, however, “this language 
was not meant to authorize denial of discovery pursuant to § 1782 solely 
because such discovery is unavailable in the foreign court, but simply to 
allow consideration of foreign discoverability (along with many other 
factors) when it might otherwise be relevant to the §1782 application.”134 
The court also made clear that if approving the application would create 
inequality by favoring the § 1782 applicant entitled to U.S.-style 
discovery, the remedy still would not be to deny the § 1782 petition, but, 
rather, to issue a discovery order that was narrower than it might otherwise 
be, and more “tailored” to the petitioner’s needs, in light of the disparity 
of means that would result from the respondent’s not having access to 
equivalent discovery in the ongoing foreign litigation.135 
B. Comparative Legal Analysis 
The case against comparative legal analysis under § 1782 was made 
by one of the principal drafters of the section’s 1964 amendments, Hans 
Smit, a comparatist himself and former colleague of Justice Ginsburg at 
Columbia Law School:136 
[T]he drafters realized that making the extension of American assistance 
dependent on foreign law would open a veritable Pandora’s box. They 
definitely did not want to have a request for cooperation turn into an 
unduly expensive and time-consuming fight about foreign law. That 
would be quite contrary to what was sought to be achieved. They also 
realized that, although civil law countries do not have discovery rules 
similar to those of common law countries, they often do have quite 
different procedures for discovering information that could not properly 
be evaluated without a rather broad understanding of the subtleties of 
the applicable foreign system. It would, they judged, be wholly 
inappropriate for an American district court to try to obtain this 
understanding for the purpose of honoring a simple request for 
assistance.137 
132.  121 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1997).  
133.  Id. at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. at 80. 
136.  See Hans Smit, International Litigation under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 
1015, n.a1 (1965). 
137.  Hans Smit, Recent Developments in International Litigation, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 215, 235 
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Yet even Professor Smit criticized the Second Circuit when it did 
not apply the Spanish law’s understanding of privileges to § 1782(a)’s 
last sentence, shielding from production information subject to “any 
legally applicable privilege.”138 Instead, the court had applied the U.S. 
attorney-client privilege.139 He argued that Spanish law should have 
been applied under a conflicts of law approach that the case called 
for.140 In an early article written after the 1964 amendments to § 1782 
had been drafted, Professor Smit explained as follows: 
The reference in new Section 1782(a) to “any legally applicable 
privilege” is not restricted to the privilege against self-incrimination 
embodied in the fifth amendment. On the contrary, it embraces any and 
all privileges that the witness may invoke under the applicable law, 
including not only privileges recognized by American rules of evidence, 
but also privileges recognized by foreign law that, under the applicable 
American conflict of laws rule, the witness may properly invoke.141 
Conflicts of law is one of many ways in which U.S. courts in foreign 
discovery and § 1782 cases need to explore foreign law.142 Understanding 
that U.S. courts must increasingly engage with foreign legal analysis 
despite the risks and pitfalls that Smit correctly signaled, Judge Friendly 
looked to comparative legal scholarship in In re Letters Rogatory to make 
a subtle and apposite conclusion about French law.143 He consulted legal 
scholarship on French law that appeared in the American Journal of 
Comparative Law.144 The case exemplifies how U.S. courts might be able 
to embrace foreign legal analysis. 
Once Judge Friendly studied the French legal institution at issue in 
his case and reached a conclusion about its effect on the discovery issue 
he was adjudicating, his finding about French law became incorporated 
into law by precedent, and was followed in a later case in the same 
(1994). 
 138.  “A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to produce a 
document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege.” 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1964). 
 139.  The case was Application of Sarrio, S.A., 119 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 1997). Professor Smit’s 
critique is in Smit, supra note 93, at 10-11, 14. 
140.  Sarrio, 119 F.3d at 143. 
141.  Smit, supra note 136, at 1033.  
142.  On the importance of comparative law to conflict of laws analysis, see Ralf Michaels & 
Christopher Whytock, Internationalizing the New Conflict of Laws Restatement, 27 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 349, 356-58 (2017). 
 143.  See In re Letters Rogatory Issued by Director of Inspection of Government of India, 385 
F.2d 1017 (1967).  
 144.  Id. The case was criticized by Hans Smit for reasons other than Justice Friendly’s account 
of French law or understanding of comparative legal analysis. See Smit, supra note 93, at 14. 
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jurisdiction which duly cited to In re Letters Rogatory’s finding.145 Judge 
Friendly’s idea of consulting scholarship rather than party experts with 
respect to foreign law is fully supported by Federal Rule 44.1, allowing 
judges to gain their understanding of foreign law broadly: “In determining 
foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or source, 
including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.”146 It is a rare court which initiates 
its own foray into comparative legal scholarship, however much courts 
may be skeptical of party experts’ testimony concerning the proper 
interpretation of foreign law.147 Judge Friendly’s exploration of 
comparative law meant that he understood the determinative way in which 
the French juge d’instruction should not be deemed equivalent to a judge 
in the U.S. sense of the term, and how the French institution of 
“instruction” should satisfy § 1782’s requirement of a “tribunal,” despite 
apparent differences with the U.S. system which might have led to the 
opposite conclusion on the part of a U.S. lawyer or judge who was less 
well informed.148 
The Seventh Circuit’s more recent idea of replacing the paid party 
expert’s testimony with the judge’s reading foreign law in translation 
could yield just the sort of unfortunate slips and falls that Smit and Justice 
Ginsburg feared to the extent that courts might feel able to read 
translations independently of explanatory commentary and scholarship. 
These slips and falls, however, will be avoidable if the judge is apprised 
of the necessity of secondary literature, to which the Seventh Circuit 
referred: 
French law, and the law of most other nations that engage in extensive 
international commerce, is widely available in English. Judges can use 
not only accepted (sometimes official) translations of statutes and 
decisions but also ample secondary literature, such as treatises and 
scholarly commentary. It is no more necessary to resort to expert 
declarations about the law of France than about the law of Louisiana, 
which had its origins in the French civil code, or the law of Puerto Rico, 
whose origins are in the Spanish civil code. No federal judge would 
admit “expert” declarations about the meaning of Louisiana law in a 
145.  See In re Letter of Request from the Gov’t of France, 139 F.R.D. 588, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
146.  FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. 
147.  For a court so skeptical that it suggested dispensing with experts in favor of reading the 
translated texts of foreign legislation, see Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetière, Inc., 621 F.3d 624 (7th 
Cir. 2010). 
148.  See In re Letters Rogatory, 385 F.2d at 1017.  
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commercial case.149 
Judge Friendly’s comparative law initiative has not been followed, at least 
not openly, in light of the Supreme Court opinion in Intel that dealt with 
the issue of U.S. courts’ interface with foreign law.150 Yet the cases show 
that determinations of foreign law are made on a continuing and 
increasing basis. It is to be hoped that comity’s increased presence in U.S. 
decision-making will also be a harbinger of comparative legal analysis 
and the willingness to examine foreign law openly and advisedly. 
C. Recent Case Law 
1. Document Location and Origin
In 2016, the Eleventh Circuit held that documents located outside the 
United States came within the purview of the court’s § 1782 powers, 
pointing out in Sergeeva v. Templeton International, Ltd.151 that under 
Federal Rule 45, those documents would be produced in the United States. 
The court thus held that this was a case of “domestic” discovery, rejecting 
the respondent’s extraterritoriality argument. The court further held that 
control over the information requested was the “legal right to obtain” such 
information.152 Sergeeva was a divorce case, an area in which § 1782 
petitions arise frequently.153 
Conversely, in In re Application of RSM Prod. Corp. v. Noble 
Energy, the court denied a § 1782 petition with respect to documents 
located outside of the United States for use in an Israeli court proceeding 
where granting the petition would have required the court to pierce the 
corporate veil of the foreign subsidiary.154 The court reached this 
conclusion despite the apparently uncontested argument that Israel’s 
courts are generally receptive to discovery from the United States.155 The 
“body of caselaw suggest[s] that § 1782 is not properly used to seek 
documents held outside the United States” by foreign subsidiaries.156 The 
Texas district court engaged in a comparative legal examination of Israel’s 
discovery laws, concluding that the information sought would not be 
149.  Bodum, 621 F.3d at 628-29. 
150.  See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 542 U.S. 241, 243 (2004). 
151.  834 F.3d 1194, 1200 (11th Cir. 2016). 
152.  Id. at 1201. 
153.  See id. at 1199, n.4. 
154.  In re Application of RSM Prod. Corp. v. Noble Energy, 195 F. Supp. 3d 899 (S.D. Tex. 
2016) 
155.  See id. at 903-04. 
156.  Id. at 904. 
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discoverable there, and attributing some weight to that factor, linking it to 
the petitioner’s attempt to profit from U.S. discovery.157 The court did not 
go so far as to find that this amounted to trying to “circumvent” the law 
of the foreign country, one of the Intel factors.158 
2. Proceedings Predating Complaints
In Mees v. Buitter,159 the issue arose as to whether § 1782’s 
requirement that the discovery be “for use” in a foreign proceeding was 
met where the party seeking it had not yet filed a complaint. The Second 
Circuit reversed the district court’s decision that the petition could not be 
granted, holding that the statutory requirement is met so long as “the 
proceeding is within reasonable contemplation.”160 The Supreme Court 
previously had addressed this issue in Intel, where it had specifically 
stated that a foreign proceeding need not be either “pending” or even 
“imminent,”161 for a U.S. court to grant a § 1782 petition. It also held that 
the applicant might win her § 1782 petition even if the discovery sought 
“was not necessary for her to succeed in the foreign proceeding.”162 
In keeping with Mees, the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York granted a § 1782 petition in 2017 to the plaintiff in In re 
Kiobel,163 who intended to bring an action in the Netherlands similar to 
the one she had lost in the U.S. Supreme Court against Royal Dutch Shell, 
a Dutch company. Petitioner Kiobel sought documents and other materials 
from the law firm that had represented Shell in the U.S. case, Cravath, 
Swaine & Moore, LLP, for information relating to the U.S. case as well as 
to some related U.S. cases,164 all of which had been brought under the 
Alien Tort Statute.165 The U.S. Kiobel case had been dismissed in 2013 
for failure to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality and failure 
to demonstrate a sufficient nexus with the United States.166 
The Southern District of New York signaled in its § 1782 decision 
that Kiobel’s request was not premature because she had demonstrated 
her intent to bring an action concretely by: 
157.  Id. at 906. 
158.  See id. 
159.  Mees v. Buiter, 793 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 2015). 
160.  Id. at 295. 
161.  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 542 U.S. 241, 259 (2004).  
162.  Id. 
163.  In re Kiobel, 16 Civ. 7992 (AKH), 2017 WL 354183 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2017).  
164.  See id. at *1-2. 
165.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948). 
166.  See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).   
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(1) draft[ing] a writ of summons, which is the initiating summons in 
Dutch proceedings; (2) appl[ying] for and obtain[ing] legal aid on behalf 
of Kiobel from the Dutch Legal Aid Board, which required a show that 
meaningful legal steps had been taken to prepare for the action; and (3) 
sen[ding] “liability letters” to Shell, which had the effect of tolling the 
statute of limitations.167 
The court also noted, in the inevitable foray into comparative law that § 
1782 requires of U.S. courts, that Dutch law demands “a certain amount 
of evidence” at the outset, before litigation can begin.168 
In In re an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to Conduct Discovery 
for Use in a Foreign Proceeding,169 the District Court for the District of 
Columbia confirmed that the legal standard for a petitioner to meet § 
1782’s “for use” in a foreign proceeding requirement is not exigent.170 
The petitioners in Hulley171 represented Rosneft, the Russian state-owned 
company, in connection with a suit against the Russian Federation 
concerning an international arbitration award to Yukos, the Russian oil 
and gas company once run by Khodorkovsky before his imprisonment.172 
Subsequently, Yukos won the largest international arbitration award in 
history ($50 billion).173 
In this case, the court nevertheless denied the petition for Federal 
Rules discovery where it concluded that discovery would be of debatable 
relevance to the foreign proceeding and be likely to cause further 
litigation. It thus weighed the importance of the discovery to the case 
against the burdens such discovery would create and found that the 
burdens outweighed the relatively weak potential significance of the 
information sought.174 
167.  Kiobel, 2017 WL 354183, at *2-3. 
168.  Id. at *3. 
169.  In re an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to Conduct Discovery for Use in a Foreign 
Proceeding, Misc. Case No. 17-1466 (BAH), 2017 WL 3708028 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2017) 
(reconsideration denied). 
170.  Id. at *10. 
 171.  Hulley Enters. v. Russian Fed’n, 211 F. Supp. 3d 269, 272–73 (D.D.C. 2016) was the In re 
an Order Pursuant court’s Memorandum Opinion granting the same three petitioners’ motion for a 
stay of their related pending lawsuit to confirm the arbitration awards. See In re an Order Pursuant, 
2017 WL 3708028 at *1. 
172.  See In re an Order Pursuant, 2017 WL 3708028 at *4-5; Yukos shareholders $50 billion 
win is largest arbitration award ever: GML director, REUTER (July 28, 2014, 5:11 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-yukos-gml/yukos-shareholders-50-billion-win-is-largest-
arbitration-award-ever-gml-director-idUSKBN0FX0O620140728 [https://perma.cc/LH3C-UAXA].  
 173.  In re an Order Pursuant, 2017 WL 3708028, at *4-5. While the respondent in Hulley 
represented Rosneft, apparently it previously had served as legal counsel for the Russian Federation. 
Id.  
174.  Id. at *13. 
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Finally, in Andover Healthcare, Inc. v. 3M Co.,175 the Eighth Circuit 
referred to the Intel criterion of party versus non-party petitioner, 
reasoning that where revealing trade secrets could have caused grave harm 
to the respondent, and the petitioner was a party to the litigation, the 
petitioner could seek authorization as a party to the action in the foreign 
proceeding for the discovery it sought.176 In that case, the district court 
had concluded that “the highly sensitive nature of the requested discovery, 
and the lack of certainty that confidentiality [could] be maintained, 
weighed heavily against ordering discovery.”177 This case is consistent 
with the recent tendency to evaluate the concerns of the foreign party and 
nation with increasing consideration. 
IV. TRANSNATIONAL DIGITAL DATA DISCOVERY AND THE NEED FOR A
NEW UNDERSTANDING OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
A new dimension to discovery issues has entered with modern 
technology and in particular with the digital storage of data. This section 
explores the new challenge. Foreign blocking statutes figure in a new and 
often confusing manner in the area of U.S. discovery with respect to 
information stored in the cloud. Digital data cases are becoming more 
frequent and have injected new issues into traditional discovery inquiries. 
The difficulty they pose is in applying existing legal criteria that were 
developed over centuries on the basis that national law is territorial, to 
cases which epitomize the deterritorialization that the Internet creates 
wherever it reaches. 
Under stare decisis, courts are bound by well-established laws of 
jurisdiction that are intertwined with discovery and blocking statute 
analysis and that all have as their point of departure two basic principles: 
(1) a court’s jurisdiction is bounded by geographical territory;178 and (2) 
in international law each nation’s legal rights are limited to its national 
territory.179 Superimposed on this is the U.S. presumption against the 
extraterritorial application of national law. This presumption, on the one 
hand, is part and parcel of international law.180 On the other hand, it is part 
of a trend towards greater respect for international comity. The 
175.  817 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2016).  
176.  Id. at 623 (citing Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004)). 
177.  Id. at 623-24. 
178.  See Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843 
(1999). 
179.  IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (7th ed. 2008). 
180.  See id. at 311-12. 
25
Curran: Discovery in a Transnational and Digital Age
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
882 AKRON LAW REVIEW [51:857 
presumption has been subject to varying interpretations in U.S. law at 
different times.181 
In dealing with unexpected scientific developments, the law has 
always had to find its way, whatever the area. In 2018, revisions of the 
Uniform Parentage Act provided for the first time for the possibility of 
more than two parents per child because of the biomedical research that 
created surrogacy and new modes of fertility.182 The Uniform Probate 
Code seems on the cusp of similar revisions.183 Judicial perspectives 
developed a great deal from the days of the first surrogacy case of Baby 
M, when a New Jersey state court applied a brew of mainly contract law 
principles, along with adoption and constitutional law analysis, because 
of the dearth of available laws better suited to the novel issue which 
biomedical innovations of the time were causing it to adjudicate.184 
Similarly, one possibility for cloud-stored data is to try to adapt ill-
fitting laws of a bygone time that speak to site of location, while another 
is to create new laws. As this Article was being written, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., a case that brought the cloud into 
confrontation with a foreign blocking statute,185 while Congress had 
proposed a new law, now enacted, to regulate the matter, known as the 
CLOUD Act.186 Courts traditionally have shown a preference for 
legislatures to act in their place where innovations in the law are called 
for. In this case, § 103(a)(1) of the CLOUD Act specifically includes, as 
part of a service provider’s obligations under the Stored Communications 
Act (SCA), the disclosure of information “located within or outside of the 
United States.”187 The issue of extraterritoriality had thus become moot. 
After the legislation was signed into law, the government obtained another 
warrant against Microsoft under the SCA.188 The Supreme Court held that 
the case before it was moot and vacated the lower court holdings.189 
 181.  In the mid-twentieth century, the presumption against extraterritoriality had weakened so 
much that the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law no longer mentioned it. See William S. 
Dodge, Understanding the Presumption against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 86. 
See also id. at 85-86 for relevant case law. Today the pendulum has swung back. See Kimmelman & 
Smith, supra note 1; Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).  
182.  Uniform Parentage Act (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017).  
 183.  These revisions to the UPC are being undertaken by the Uniform Law Commission’s Joint 
Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts. Email from Prof. Tom Gallanis, Subcomm. on 
U.P.C. Rev. to Vivian Grosswald Curran (Jan. 31, 2018) (on file with author). 
184.  Matter of Baby M., 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. 1987). 
185.  U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018). 
186.  See id. 
187.  Id. at 1888 (emphasis added). 
188.  Id.   
189.  Id. 
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What the legislation does not address is the non-localizable nature of 
data. It is this characteristic that case law also has not yet addressed, with 
the exception of the appellate court’s concurrence in Microsoft.190 
Microsoft, like most of the digital data cases, involved both a foreign 
blocking statute and a U.S. statute, here the SCA.191 The SCA authorizes 
searches and seizures of email accounts stored on the web.192 Microsoft 
had been held in contempt of court when it refused to make disclosures in 
satisfaction of a government warrant issued under this law with respect to 
a client suspected of criminal conduct.193 Microsoft disclosed information 
it said was stored in the United States, but refused to disclose other 
information requested, which it said was on a server based in Ireland.194 
The majority defined a server as “a shared computer on a network 
that provides services to clients,”195 and an Internet-connected server as a 
“common example of a server.”196 The majority proceeded to explore the 
SCA’s legislative history, concluding that its purpose was to extend 
Fourth Amendment privacy protections to, among others, email account 
holders.197 
The next step for the majority was to invoke the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in U.S. statutes, a natural approach since the case arose 
under a statute and also since Microsoft had posed its objections to 
discovery in terms of the territoriality of the server (i.e., its location in 
Ireland) in keeping with digital data case precedents.198 The court found 
that the statutory terms permitting searches and seizures, including 
amendments, were all limited to the national territory of the United 
States199 and that the statute’s principal purpose was to protect the privacy 
of users.200 It concluded that the government had not rebutted the 
 190.  Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E–Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corporation, 829 F.3d 197, 222-32 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring), vacated and 
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).  
191.  Microsoft, 138 S. Ct. at 1186. 
192.  Id.  
193.  Id. at 1187.  
194.  Matter of Warrant, 829 F.3d at 200.  
195.  Id. 
196.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
197.  See id. at 205. 
198.  See id. at 209 (citing RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 179 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) and other 
U.S. Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases dealing with the presumption, and following the 
analytical approach in presumption against extraterritorial application cases outlined in Morrison v. 
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261-65 (2010)).  
199.  Matter of Warrant, 829 F.3d. at 213. 
200.  Id. at 219. 
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presumption against extraterritoriality. In the government’s appeal to the 
Supreme Court, the issue of whether there is territory was not raised. 
The Second Circuit’s concurring opinion addressed the novel issues 
the majority had not discussed: “What searches are unreasonable is . . . a 
difficult question . . . when courts are assessing statutory authorizations of 
novel types of searches to deal with novel types of threats.”201 The 
concurring opinion sized up the problem as being not one primarily of 
privacy, but as the “[t]ricky [issue], in a world of transnational 
transactions taking place in multiple jurisdictions at once, [of] deciding 
whether a proposed application of a statute is domestic or 
extraterritorial.”202 
In Microsoft, it would have been uncontested that the government’s 
right to search and seize would not have permitted it to enter Ireland,203 
but, given the nature of the information sought in this case, the 
government argued that it had a right to the contested data to the extent 
that Microsoft had access to it.204 The government’s argument had a basis 
in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442(1)(a): “A court 
or agency in the United States, when authorized by statute or rule of court, 
may authorize a person subject to its jurisdiction to produce documents, 
objects or other information . . . even if the information or the person in 
possession of the information is outside the United States.” Moreover, in 
this case, Microsoft could access the documents from the United States. 
This analysis derives from the premise that the information was 
tangible, however. Judge Lynch articulated the current dilemma in 
applying a law of physically embodied information as follows: 
Electronic “documents” . . . are different. Their location on a computer 
server in a foreign country is, in important ways, merely virtual . . . the 
very idea of online data being located in a physical ‘place’ is becoming 
rapidly outdated, because computer files can be fragmented and 
dispersed across many servers. Corporate employees in the United 
States can review these records, when responding to the “warrant” or 
subpoena or court order just as they can do in the ordinary course of 
business . . . without ever leaving their desks in the United States.205 
201.  Id. at 225 (Lynch, J., concurring). 
202.  Id. at 226 (emphasis added). 
203.  See id. at 227. 
204.  See id. 
205.  Id. at 229 (quoting in part Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 408 (2014)). 
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The cloud thus casts a new light on the U.S. legal concept of 
extraterritoriality by virtue of making “location . . . virtual”206 and by 
allowing data to be simultaneously accessed in many different places. 
Concepts of court jurisdiction and of transnational discovery arose before 
the advent of the Internet. The same is true for the statutes under which 
the digital data cases of the last years have been arising. Judge Lynch at 
least implicitly suggested in Microsoft that a relevant inquiry is if 
Congress, when enacting the SCA, “gave any thought at all to potential 
transnational applications of the statute.”207 
In 2017, a year after the Second Circuit held that Microsoft could not 
be forced to disclose information under the SCA, the District Court for 
the Central District of California held that Google could be compelled to 
do so pursuant to the same statute.208 Looking to five other cases involving 
Google, and distinguishing Microsoft on the facts, the court held that no 
invasion of privacy occurs before data is disclosed in the United States.209 
The court noted that Google transmitted data in an automated manner, 
based on algorithms and unrelated to any actions taken by account 
holders.210 
Microsoft, on the other hand, stores its data according to country 
codes its account holders indicate.211 The court noted another contrast in 
that, unlike Microsoft’s counterparts, Google’s automatic and frequent 
data transmissions take no account of the various blocking laws of the 
countries in which their data may, often fleetingly, be located at any given 
point.212 
The court noted that the Second Circuit’s majority Microsoft opinion 
had been rejected by subsequent courts which had considered the issue, 
as well as by dissenting justices, particularly in its finding that the SCA 
would be applied extraterritorially were it to be applied, because the 
information requested was located in Ireland,213 despite the fact that 
Microsoft could access the information from the United States. 
In the view of this court, as well as of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in In re Search Warrant,214 “the fluid nature of the cloud 
206.  Id. 
207.  Id. at 231. 
208.  In re Search of Info. Assoc. with Accts., 268 F. Supp. 3d 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2017). 
209.  Id. at 1 (citing to the five Google precedents, at id. n.1). 
210.  See id. 
211.  Id. at 2. 
212.  Id. 
213.  Id. at 4-5. 
214.  In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 719 (E.D. Pa. 
2017). 
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makes it uncertain whether a foreign state’s sovereignty or which foreign 
state’s sovereignty is implicated.”215 The court also evoked the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin in which the district court in In re Information 
associated with one Yahoo216 held that the location of the service provider 
is the location of interest with respect to determining the court’s 
jurisdiction, which then can compel disclosure of any information the 
service provider possesses or controls.217 These and other cases, with the 
exception of Microsoft, all have held that the application of the SCA was 
domestic, not extraterritorial. In those cases, as the courts have noted, 
unlike in Microsoft, the account holders did not know where their data 
was stored.218 
In ordering that Google be compelled to disclose the information the 
government sought pursuant to the SCA, the court held as follows: 
No human hand in a foreign country is involved. No one goes to a 
foreign country to retrieve data. All of the actions Google described are 
within its authority under § 271(c)(1) and its user agreement. There is 
no “seizure” of data, as if from someone else in a location it does not 
control. Google has complete discretion to move data around the globe 
and does so on a regular basis, irrespective of foreign blocking statutes. 
It cannot seize data already within its possession, custody and control.219 
This reasoning does not distinguish between the power of the Internet 
provider which through automated algorithms sends data on the cloud and 
the reach of an American domestic law statute. When speaking of the 
cloud, territorial terms may be inapposite, such that “everywhere” might 
be a less apt representation than “infinite.” Should the SCA’s reach 
become infinite by virtue substantially of the accessibility Google has to 
data stored on the cloud from its U.S. offices? If not, should the cloud 
provide criminals an escape route that will elude the SCA? Meanwhile, 
what does seem certain is that the courts will need to continue to grapple 
with how the concept of territoriality and data are to be understood 
together.220 
215.  In re Search of Info., 268 F. Supp. 3d at 6. 
 216.  In re Info. assoc. with one Yahoo email address that is stored at premises controlled by 
Yahoo, Nos. 17–M–1234, 17–M–1235, 2017 WL 706307, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 21, 2017). 
217.  Id. 
218.  In re Search of Info., 268 F. Supp. 3d at 8. 
219.  Id. 
220.  For scholarship in this area, see Kerr, supra note 205; Jennifer Daskal, The Un-
Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326 (2015). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Edward Levi once described the process of the common law as 
society’s needs impelling lawyers to knock at the doors of the courts to 
make an argument repeatedly unsuccessful until a dissenting opinion 
finally embraces that viewpoint contrary to prevailing legal authority, and, 
at an ulterior stage, fortified by the support of the respected dissenting 
justice, the same position eventually becomes the majority rule.221 The 
need for open and fruitful comparative judicial legal engagement is one 
such societal need for law in the transnational era. Judge Friendly 
illuminated the path. 
U.S. judges, like their colleagues across the world, necessarily must 
draw conclusions about foreign law at rates never seen before. It would 
be preferable for U.S. courts to do so with the tools of comparative legal 
scholarship in that area, and perhaps with court-appointed experts in 
foreign law, as the courts in European countries have been doing for many 
years.222 While law’s globalization demands comparative legal work, 
globalization itself also requires interdisciplinary work.223 In particular, 
the digitalization of data requires legal concepts that are better adapted to 
the Internet’s almost total deterritorialization of law, a field that already 
is experiencing deterritorialization through many factors in the modern 
age. But, after all, this story is the story of law itself, for, as one scholar 
has put it, “the history of law is no more than [that of] its 
transformations.”224 
221.  Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1948).  
 222.  Private conversations with judges on two of France’s Supreme Courts and participation in 
many conferences in France have allowed the author to observe that foreign (at least French) courts 
operate with teams of comparative legal scholars to assist them in their work. 
223.  Or, as Frydman puts it, a “transdisciplinary approach.” See Frydman, supra note 11, at 14. 
224.  Id. at 9. 
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